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C
entral banks have existed since the Swedish
Riksbank began operation in 1668. The
Federal Reserve, which was created in 1913,
is thus a relative newcomer in the history of central
banking: At the time of its creation, however, only 20
other central banks existed. The number of central
banks rose rapidly in the post-World War II period
primarily as a result of decolonization. This number
expanded again in the early 1990s as the collapse of
the Soviet Union led to the establishment of central
banks by the former Soviet republics. By 1997 there
were 172 central banks.1 In 1998 the coterie of
central banks expanded by one, when the European
Central Bank (ECB) became the newest member.
Central banking has changed greatly since its
early history, when the primary function of a central
bank was to act as the government’s banker. Broz
(1998) argues that financing military endeavors was
the main reason for the establishment of the early
central banks, pointing out that all “central banks
in existence before 1850 were chartered in the
context of war.”2
By the time the Federal Reserve was established,
the role of the central bank had evolved to focus
primarily on providing stability in banking and
financial systems. At this point, no mention had
been made of monetary policy. The Federal Open
Market Committee (FOMC), the policymaking group
of the Federal Reserve, was not created until 1933.3
Today the primary function of a central bank
is, in fact, monetary policy. Moreover, it is widely
accepted that a central bank needs to be able to
operate independently within the government to
best achieve its monetary policy goals. The statutes
governing the ECB reflect these shifts and establish
monetary policy as the primary function of the ECB,
with many other tasks being delegated to the national
central banks. The 1993 Maastricht Treaty amend-
ments to the Treaty Establishing the European
Community required that not only the ECB, but
also the national central banks, be independent. In
the 10 years since the Maastricht Treaty was signed,
increasing attention has focused on counterbalanc-
ing central bank independence with accountability
and transparency.
This article examines modern central banking
with a focus on the world’s two most prominent
central banks—the Federal Reserve System and the
European Central Bank.4 First, it examines the struc-
ture and appointment process of the key policy-
makers at the central banks. Next, it highlights the
tasks of the central banks, focusing on the monetary
policy process. The goals and tools of monetary
policy as well as the decisionmaking process and
how they differ in each system are discussed. Finally,
the article examines accountability and transparency
in the Federal Reserve and the ECB.
STRUCTURE OF THE ECB AND THE
FEDERAL RESERVE
On June 1, 1998, the Executive Board of the ECB
held its first meeting at its headquarters in Frankfurt,
Germany. Six months later the ECB assumed respon-
sibility for monetary policy in the euro area, bringing
to fruition a plan for monetary union first outlined
nearly two decades earlier.5
4 The United States and the euro area account for 37 percent of world
output (International Monetary Fund, 2002, Statistical Appendix
Table A).
5 See the boxed insert “The Path to Monetary Union.”
1 See Pringle (2002).
2 Broz (1998, p. 239).
3 In 1923 the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, Chicago, Cleveland,
New York, and Philadelphia established an Open Market Investment
Committee to coordinate open market operations conducted by these
Reserve Banks. In 1930 this was replaced by the Open Market Policy
Conference consisting of the heads of all 12 regional Banks and the
members of the Board of Governors. It was not until the 1935 amend-
ment to the Federal Reserve Act that the regional Banks were prohibited
from conducting independent open market operations. See Meulendyke
(1998) for more details.
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THE PATH TO MONETARY UNION
In March 1957, six countries—Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—
signed the Treaty of Rome, creating the European
Economic Community. The main focus of the
treaty was the creation of a customs union among
the member countries.1 Coordination of monetary
and fiscal policies was mentioned by the Treaty
as important to the well-functioning of a customs
union. The coordination of general economic
policies took place through meetings of the Council
of Economics and Finance Ministers. In 1964
the Committee of Central Bank Governors was
established to coordinate monetary polices in
the member states. This was primarily a forum
for exchanging information.
In the late 1960s economic and monetary
coordination received greater focus, partly in
response to the success of the customs union and
partly in response to the emerging turbulence in
the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system.2
In 1970 the Council of the European Communities
established a committee to discuss economic and
monetary union. The group, led by Pierre Werner,
the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, issued a report
advocating a three-stage movement to economic
and monetary union by the end of the decade.
Although the Council initially supported the plan,
the economic instability resulting from the collapse
of the Bretton Woods system and the oil crisis in
the early 1970s led to its demise. It was not until
1988 that another committee was established to
address the issue of monetary and economic
union, this time led by Jacques Delors, the head
of the European Commission.
During the 18-year interval, many changes
had occurred. The European Community went
through three expansions, incorporating six new
members.3In 1979 the European Monetary System
(EMS) created a fixed exchange rate system in
which all member currencies, except the pound
sterling, participated. Despite frequent adjustments
to the exchange rates in the early years, the success
of the EMS in reducing exchange rate variability
and the willingness of countries to adopt the
economic policies necessary to stabilize exchange
rates led to a renewed commitment toward econ-
omic and monetary integration. Economic integra-
tion was furthered by the passage of the Single
European Act in 1987, which called for the creation
of a free market in the movement of goods, ser-
vices, and capital by 1993. The creation of a single
European market, it was argued, would be ham-
pered by fluctuations in exchange rates as well
as the costs of exchanging currencies.
In April 1989 the Delors committee released
its report. Like the Werner report, it called for a
three-stage process to achieve economic and
monetary union within a decade.4The culmination
of the process would be the creation of a supra-
national institution to set monetary policy and a
single currency.
In December 1991, the European Council
finalized an agreement on changes to the Treaty
of Rome to attain economic and monetary union.5
The amendments (often referred to as the
Maastricht Treaty, after the Dutch town where
the agreement was reached) came into effect in
November 1993 following ratification by the
member states.6
In January 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden
entered the European Union, bringing the mem-
bership to 15. In May 1998, 11 countries (Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain)
were certified as having met the membership
criteria for admission to monetary union and
became members effective January 1, 1999.7
Greece met the membership criteria in 2000 and
became the 12th member in January 2001.
4 The Werner report called for greater integration of fiscal policies
than did the Delors report. The former envisioned the transfer of
national budgetary powers to the European Community (see Wellnik,
1997).
5 The United Kingdom supported the changes only after it was given
the right to opt out of monetary union.
6 Denmark rejected the Maastricht Treaty in a referendum. A second
referendum passed after Denmark was also given the right to opt
out of monetary union.
7 Denmark and the United Kingdom exercised their rights to opt out
of monetary union. Sweden guaranteed its lack of fitness for mem-
bership by failing to join the exchange rate mechanism of the
European Monetary System. For a discussion of the membership
criteria for monetary union, see Pollard (1995).
1 A customs union is characterized by free trade among the member
countries in conjunction with a common external tariff and common
trade policy toward nonmember countries.
2 For a more detailed discussion of the historical development of
monetary union in Europe, see Arestis, McCauley, and Sawyer (1999).
3 Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom joined in 1973; Greece
in 1981; and Portugal and Spain in 1986.The euro area is unique among common-
currency areas. Twelve sovereign nations have not
only adopted a common currency, the euro, but have
also created a supranational organization, the ECB;
this institution, along with input from the head of
each member country’s national central bank, sets
monetary policy for the euro area.
Ninety years ago, the Federal Reserve Act created
a central bank for the United States consisting of 12
regional (District) Federal Reserve Banks (Figure 1)
and a seven-member Federal Reserve Board in
Washington, D.C.6 In 1935 the Federal Reserve
Board was renamed the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System.
The European System of Central Banks consists
of 15 national central banks (Figure 2) and a six-
member Executive Board in Frankfurt, Germany.
The 15 central banks correspond to the 15 member
countries of the European Union. The three central
banks whose countries are not members of the
euro area participate in few of the activities of the
European System of Central Banks. The Eurosystem
is the term used to refer to the ECB and the 12
national central banks of the member countries.7
The 12 Districts of the Federal Reserve System,
in contrast to the national central banks of the Euro-
system, do not correspond to political entities. These
12 Districts are divided along county lines, encom-
passing not only multiple states, but portions of
states. Indeed, in the early years of the Federal
Reserve System, some border counties petitioned
and were allowed to switch Districts.8
Appointments to the Board of
Governors and Executive Board
The members of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System are nominated by the
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7 These countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom are the three nonmembers.
8 See Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis (1988), Hammes (2001),
and Primm (1989) for more details on the creation of the 12 Districts.
The Federal Reserve System
Alaska and Hawaii are part



























6 The Federal Reserve Act specified that there be “not less than eight
nor more than twelve” Districts (Section 2.1); the text appears at
<fedweb.frb.gov/fedweb/board/legal/lawlib/law-fra.htm>.President of the United States and must be confirmed
by the U.S. Senate. The chairman and vice chairman
are appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate from among the members of the Board,
although appointment to these roles may be simul-
taneous with appointment to the Board.
In Europe the governments of all the member
states of the euro area must agree on the appoint-
ments to the Executive Board. The process begins
with a recommendation by the Council of Economics
and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN).9 Since ECOFIN
comprises the finance ministers of the member
countries of the European Union, its recommenda-
tions will reflect the consensus of the member
governments. Once ECOFIN makes its recommenda-
tion, the European Parliament and the Governing
Council of the ECB are consulted.10 Following these
consultations the appointments are confirmed by
the heads of state or government of the euro area
members.
The Federal Reserve Act and the Maastricht
Treaty both briefly mention qualifications for mem-
bership on the respective boards. The Federal Reserve
Act specifies that
In selecting the members of the Board, not
more than one of whom shall be selected
from any one Federal Reserve district, the
President shall have due regard to a fair
representation of the financial, agricultural,
industrial, and commercial interests, and



















NOTE: Only the central banks of the blue shaded countries
are members of the Eurosystem.
Figure 2
9 See the boxed insert “Institutions of the European Union.”
10 The Governing Council consists of the members of the Executive
Board and the heads of the 12 central banks in the euro area.The treaty establishing the ECB set no such require-
ment for regional or national diversity, simply stating
that “only nationals of Member States may be mem-
bers of the Executive Board” (Article 112).11 The
treaty did set further qualifications for the Board
members, stating that they must be “persons of
recognized standing and professional experience
in monetary or banking matters” (Article 112). 
In practice, the regional restriction placed by the
Federal Reserve Act is loosely applied. For example,
the two most recently appointed members, Ben
Bernanke and Donald Kohn, represent the Atlanta
and Kansas City Districts, respectively. Neither lived
nor worked in these Districts at the time of his
appointment. What then is the link with the Districts
they represent? Bernanke was born in Georgia and
Kohn worked at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City in the early 1970s.
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INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION1
Four institutions of the European Union are
mentioned throughout the text. They are the
European Commission, the Council of the European
Union, the European Council, and the European
Parliament.
The European Commission is the executive
branch of the European Union government. The
president of the Commission is nominated by the
European Council and approved by the European
Parliament. The European Council in consultation
with the President of the Commission chooses the
other 19 commissioners. The European Parliament
must reject or accept the proposed Commission,
but may not reject individual members. The
appointments to the 20-member commission are
based on nationalities. France, Germany, Italy,
Spain, and the United Kingdom each are allocated
two commissioners with the remaining ten EU
countries each allowed one appointment.2 All
commissioners serve a five-year renewable term.
The Commission has four main roles: (i) initiate
policies by proposing legislation to the Council
and European Parliament; (ii) administer and
implement European Union policies; (iii) enforce
European Union laws; and (iv) represent the
European Union internationally, particularly in
negotiations regarding trade and cooperation.
During their term in office the commissioners
are expected to represent the interests of the
European Union and not those of their home
countries. In contrast, the Council of the European
Union (usually referred to as the Council) repre-
sents the national governments. The composition
of the Council changes depending upon the issue
being considered. For example, the agricultural
ministers of the member states address issues
related to the Common Agricultural Policy. The
Council of Economics and Finance Ministers
coordinates the economic policies of the member
states.
The Council is the main decisionmaking body
of the European Union. Each country is allocated
a number of votes based loosely on the size of its
population. The Council enacts European Union
laws stemming from proposals submitted by the
Commission. Most decisions are made by a quali-
fied majority vote, which requires 62 of 87 votes
or in some cases 62 votes from at least ten member
countries. Some policies such as tax measures
and foreign policy require unanimity.
The European Council consists of the heads
of state or government of the 15 member countries
and the president of the European Commission
(as a non-voting member). It is not legally an insti-
tution of the European Union but plays a key role.
The presidency of the European Council rotates
among the member states on a six-month basis.
The European Council meets at least twice per year
(in June and December). Decisions are generally
reached through consensus.
The European Parliament is the other legisla-
tive institution of the European Union. Its 626
members are directly elected for five-year terms.
Although elected nationally, the members of
Parliament are grouped according to party affilia-
tion and not nationality. Although the Parliament
shares some legislative powers with the Council,
its main purpose is to exercise democratic control
over European Union institutions.
1 Information in this section comes from European Communities
(1995-2002) and European Parliament (2001).
2 Under the Treaty of Amsterdam the number of commissioners
from any member country will be limited to one, at most, as the
European Union expands eastward.
11 The articles listed in the text refer to the Treaty Establishing the
European Community as amended by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997.The appointments to the Executive Board of
the Eurosystem, however, have thus far been made
to ensure national diversity. Indeed, given that there
are only half as many positions on this Board as
there are current euro area member countries and
that the ratio will decline as more countries achieve
membership, it is unlikely that there will ever be two
Board members appointed from the same country.
Currently, all the members of the Executive
Board are experienced central bankers, each having
served on the staff of his or her national central
bank.12 Despite the requirement that the members
of the Fed’s Board of Governors should reflect a
range of interests, in recent years they have been
primarily economists and/or bankers.13
Term of Office. Members of the Board of
Governors are appointed for a 14-year term, nearly
twice as long as the eight-year term for members
of the Executive Board. Both are nonrenewable.
The actual term for a member of the Board of
Governors could, however, be much longer: If a
member resigns prior to the end of the term of
office, the new member is appointed to serve the
remainder of the term and then can be appointed
to a full 14-year term.14 Alan Greenspan, for exam-
ple, was appointed in 1987 to fill the remaining
years of Paul Volcker’s term and was reappointed
in 1992 to a 14-year term.
The chairman and vice chairman of the Board
of Governors serve four-year terms that may be
renewed as long as their terms on the Board have
not expired. Renewal requires nomination by the
President of the United States and the consent of the
U.S. Senate. On the Executive Board, the president
and vice president are appointed for the full eight-
year nonrenewable term.
The terms of members on both Boards are stag-
gered to provide continuity.15 In the United States,
however, few members now serve the full 14 years
and the appointment process is sometimes slow,
so multiple vacancies may occur. All members of
the current Board of Governors, with the exception
of the Chairman, were appointed within the last five
years, and four members were appointed in the last
two years. Figures 3 and 4 show the current mem-
bers of the Board of Governors and the Executive
Board, respectively, along with the District or country
they represent and the expiration date of their terms.
Appointments of the District Bank
Presidents and the Governors of the
National Central Banks 
The president of a Federal Reserve Bank is
appointed by the board of directors of that Bank,
subject to the approval of the Board of Governors.
The term of office of all the presidents expires on
the same date, the last day of February in years end-
ing with a 1 or 6. The president may be reappointed
for an indefinite number of five-year terms, subject
to the following restrictions: mandatory retirement
at age 65 if appointed at or before age 55 or manda-
tory retirement at age 70 or a 10-year term (which-
ever comes first) if appointed after age 55.16 There
is no requirement that the president be a resident
of the District prior to appointment.
The appointment of the governor of each
national central bank in the euro area is deter-
mined by the respective national government. The
Maastricht Treaty requires that the term of office
be a minimum of five years. The term varies across
countries from five to eight years.17 Eight of the 12
countries allow for a renewable term. The Executive
Board need not be consulted and has no veto power
over these appointments.
Tasks of the Central Banks
Apart from conducting monetary policy, central
banks have a variety of other tasks. These other
duties are often related to the monetary policy func-
tion. In general the duties of the Federal Reserve
and the Eurosystem (listed in Table 1) are similar,
yet there are some key differences.18
Both central banks are the sole issuer of bank-
notes for their respective economies. In the euro
area, production and distribution is controlled by
16 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2003
16 No such age restriction applies to members of the Board of Governors.
Alan Greenspan, for example, will be 78 when his current term as
Chairman expires in 2004.
17 The term is five years in Austria, Belgium, Italy, and Portugal; six years
in France, Greece, Luxembourg, and Spain; seven years in Finland,
Ireland, and the Netherlands; and eight years in Germany. 
18 See Board of Governors (1994) for a more detailed description of the
tasks of the Federal Reserve System.
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12 Brief biographies of the members of the Executive Board are available
at <www.ecb.int/about/ab1mem.htm>.
13 Brief biographies of the members of the Board of Governors are
available at <www.federalreserve.gov/bios>.
14 Since the 1935 amendment to the Federal Reserve Act restricted
future appointees to the Board of Governors to one full term, the
longest anyone has served is 21 years.
15 To achieve this in the ECB, the terms of office were set at two to eight
years for the initial Executive Board members.JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2003      17





















































NOTE: Date indicates expiration of term.




(May 31, 2010)the ECB with production occurring in all 12 member
countries. In the United States, Federal Reserve notes
are produced by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing
(part of the U.S. Treasury Department) under the
direction of the Board of Governors. Federal Reserve
notes are then purchased at cost, not face value,
by the Federal Reserve Banks. Production takes place
in only two locations—Fort Worth, Texas, and
Washington, D.C.
Neither the ECB nor the Federal Reserve is
responsible for exchange rate policy (for example,
deciding whether to enter into a fixed exchange rate
arrangement). This responsibility lies with ECOFIN
in the euro area and the Treasury Department in the
United States. ECOFIN is required, however, to con-
sult the ECB before entering into any exchange rate
arrangements and must not allow such arrangements
to take precedence over the ECB’s price stability
objective (Article 111). Both central banks, however,
may intervene in foreign exchange markets and
may hold and manage foreign currency reserves. 
Both central banks provide financial services to
the government. These tasks are primarily handled
by one of the Reserve Banks in the United States,
currently the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. In
the euro area each national central bank serves as
fiscal agent for its own government. There are limita-
tions placed on the fiscal agency function of both
central banks to prevent the government from using
this relationship to finance budget deficits. For exam-
ple, both the Federal Reserve and the European
System of Central Banks are prohibited from extend-
ing loans to the government or from directly pur-
chasing securities from the government.
Because of the key role the financial system
plays in the economy, maintaining the stability of
the financial system is an important objective of
both central banks. The Federal Reserve plays a role
in supervising and regulating banks to this end. It
shares supervisory tasks with three federal agencies
and with state agencies. In addition the Federal
Reserve shares tasks with foreign agencies in super-
vising U.S. banks with branches abroad and foreign
bank branches in the United States.
The Federal Reserve serves as a bank regulator
in setting standards regarding the operations and
activities of banks. As a complement to this regula-
tion, the Federal Reserve implements consumer
protection laws in the area of credit and financial
transactions.
The European System of Central Banks has no
direct role in banking supervision. The Maastricht
Treaty simply states that it
shall contribute to the smooth conduct of
policies pursued by the competent authori-
ties relating to the prudential supervision
of credit institutions. (Article 105) 
Responsibility for supervision in the euro area is
determined nationally. Although most national
central banks have some role in supervision, several
18 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2003
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Tasks of the Federal Reserve System and European System of Central Banks
FRS ESCB
Define and implement monetary policy Yes Yes
Issue banknotes Yes Yes
Conduct foreign exchange operations Yes Yes
Hold and manage official reserves Yes Yes
Act as the fiscal agent for the government Yes NCBS
Promote stability of financial system Yes Yes
Supervise and regulate banks Yes Some NCBS
Implement consumer protection laws Yes Some NCBS
Promote the smooth operation of the payments system Yes Yes
Collect statistical information Yes Yes
Participate in international monetary institutions Yes Yes
NOTE: NCBS refers to national central banks of the Eurosystem.
Table 1countries have followed or are considering following
the lead of the United Kingdom in removing super-
vision from the functions of the central bank. The
ECB has argued for expanding the supervisory role
of the national central banks, as well as increasing
cooperation among those banks (ECB, 2001b).19 In
April 2001 the European System of Central Banks
reached an agreement with the banking supervisory
authorities in the European Union countries to
increase cooperation.20
An important task related to supervision is the
role of the central bank as a lender of last resort.
The Federal Reserve can use the discount window
(discussed here later) to make loans to banks that
are, although solvent, temporarily illiquid. The
Maastricht Treaty does not mention a lender of last
resort function for the ECB, and the ECB has been
criticized for lacking this function.21 Perhaps as a
result of this criticism, although it remains silent
about the specifics, the ECB has reiterated that it has
the ability and the willingness to handle a liquidity
crisis in the euro area banking system. Willem
Duisenberg, president of the ECB, said the following
in response to a question regarding the role of the
ECB as a lender of last resort: “The Governing Council
has this issue well under control but will never make
anything public in this regard” (Duisenberg, 1998).
Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, a member of the Execu-
tive Board, stated that 
To the extent that there would be an overall
liquidity effect that is relevant for monetary
policy or a financial stability implication for
the euro area, the Eurosystem itself would be
actively involved. (Padoa-Schioppa, 1999) 
Financial regulation and consumer protection
in credit and financial matters generally remains at
the national level in the Eurosystem, although the
European Union is looking at ways to establish reg-
ulations both to promote financial integration and
handle the regulatory complications resulting from
such integration.
The role of the central bank in overseeing the
payments system is linked to both its role in ensur-
ing the stability of the financial system and its con-
duct of monetary policy. The Protocol on the Statute
of the European System of Central Banks and of the
European Central Bank permits the ECB and the
national central banks operational roles in the pay-
ments system and gives the ECB the authority to
make regulations to “ensure efficient and sound
clearing and payment systems” (Article 22). National
central banks also provide oversight for payment
and clearing systems operated by private entities.
In preparation for monetary union, domestic pay-
ments systems were required to meet minimum
standards. The ECB operates TARGET, a real-time
gross settlement system to aid in central bank opera-
tions and the settlement of cross-border and large-
value euro payments in the euro area.22 The Federal
Reserve both operates clearing and payments sys-
tems and oversees those operated by private entities.
Both central banks cooperate internationally,
generally through the Bank for International Settle-
ments, in working to minimize the risk of problems
arising in cross-border payments. International
cooperation extends to other areas of central bank-
ing, particularly in issues related to financial stability
and monetary policy. Central bankers from the ECB
and the Federal Reserve participate in meetings of
the international monetary institutions as well as
less formal forums for discussion.
Both central banks collect and publish data
related to banking and monetary aggregates, as well
as other indicators of economic activity. These data
are particularly useful in the central banks’ task of
implementing monetary policy. Interestingly, neither
central bank collects the data used to measure infla-
tion. These data are constructed by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics in the United States and Eurostat in
the European Union.
MONETARY POLICY
The main function of both the Federal Reserve
and the ECB is to conduct monetary policy to
achieve the goals assigned by their respective char-
ters. This section begins with a discussion of these
goals, followed by an analysis of the tools available
to the two central banks in conducting monetary
policy. It then turns to the monetary policy deci-
sion process, looking at both the differences in the
decisionmaking bodies in the United States and the
euro area and the process by which decisions are
made.
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19 This document provides an overview of the debate regarding the role
of central banks in banking supervision. 
20 See ECB (2001a).
21 See, for example, Bordo and Jonung (1999) and Prati and Schinasi (1998).Monetary Policy Goals
The primary goal of the Eurosystem as set forth
by the Maastricht Treaty is to “maintain price stabil-
ity” (Article 105.1). The treaty further instructs the
Eurosystem to “support the general economic
policies” (Article 105.1) in the euro area without
prejudice to the goal of price stability. Thus, the
treaty makes it clear that any other objectives are
secondary to that of price stability.
The ECB has given a quantitative definition to
its mandate of price stability. Price stability is “a
year-on-year increase in consumer prices of below
2%” (ECB, 2001c) as measured by the monetary
union index of consumer prices for the euro area.23
Because prices are affected in the short-run by many
factors outside the control of the central bank and
because monetary policy actions take time to affect
inflation, the objective is seen as applying over the
medium term.
The Federal Reserve System has three policy
goals: “maximum employment, stable prices and
moderate long-term interest rates” (Section 2A).24
Unlike the Eurosystem’s mandate, price stability is
not given a higher priority than the other goals.
Clearly, the policymakers of the Federal Reserve
must assign at least an implicit ranking to these
goals; in the long-run all three goals are compatible,
but this is not necessarily true at every point in time.
Perhaps as a result of this incompatibility, the Federal
Reserve has never defined any of the goals.25 Alan
Greenspan has given what he termed “an operating
definition of price stability”: “Price stability obtains
when economic agents no longer take account of
the prospective change in the general price level in
their economic decisionmaking” (Greenspan 1996).
Monetary Policy Tools
The tools available to the two central banks are
listed in Table 2.26 In its policy meetings, the Federal
Reserve sets a target for the federal funds rate, the
interest rate banks charge each other to borrow
reserves overnight. The Federal Reserve does not
directly determine this interest rate but can control
it through open market operations, which directly
affect bank reserves. The Federal Reserve conducts
20 JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2003
24 The 1913 Federal Reserve Act did not contain any macroeconomic
goals. The 1946 Employment Act required the federal government to
“promote maximum employment, production and purchasing power.”
Although the act did not mention the Federal Reserve, it was interpreted
as applying to it. The 1977 Federal Reserve Reform Act specified the
three goals listed in the text. See Judd and Rudebusch (1999) for a
discussion of the goals of U.S. monetary policy.
25 The 1978 Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act (commonly
known as the Humphrey-Hawkins Act) specified goals of 3 percent for
inflation and 4 percent for unemployment to be reached by 1983. The
President was required to report in the Economic Report of the President
the progress in meeting these goals. If the goals could not be met, the
President was required to set revised goals. The Federal Reserve was
required to report to Congress twice per year on its own objectives and
how these related to the administration’s goals. In practice, the Federal
Reserve compared its forecasts for growth, unemployment, and infla-
tion over the next two years with those of the administration. 
26 See Board of Governors (1994, Chap. 3) and ECB (2002) for a more
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Tools of Monetary Policy
Federal Reserve ECB
Open market operations Open market operations
Discount window Standing facilities
Reserve requirements Reserve requirements
Table 2
23 The monetary union index of consumer prices is a weighted average of
the harmonized indexes of consumer prices for the euro area countries.
The weights are based on each country’s share of euro area private
domestic consumption expenditures. The harmonized indexes of
consumer prices cover the same set of goods and services in each
country and are calculated using the same methodology. The weights
given to each item within the index, however, vary across countries
based on the expenditure habits of the country’s consumers. open market operations by buying or selling U.S.
government securities (typically Treasury bills).
Generally, open market operations are conducted
as repurchase agreements. For example, the Federal
Reserve sells securities with an agreement to repur-
chase them at a later date, usually no more than
seven days later. The open market desk at the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York is active daily in the
market. As Figure 5 shows, through open market
operations the Federal Reserve manages to keep
the federal funds rate close to its target rate.27
Open market operations conducted by the ECB
are similar in some respects to those of the Federal
Reserve. The ECB’s most common open market
operations, that is, main refinancing operations,
are repurchase agreements that have a maturity of
two weeks. There are, however, a few key differences
between the use of open market operations by the
Federal Reserve and the ECB. The ECB conducts
main refinancing operations only once per week in
contrast to the Fed’s daily operations. Secondly, the
Federal Reserve deals exclusively in U.S. government
securities, whereas the ECB has a broader range of
assets (even beyond that of securities issued by
member country governments) that it accepts.
Another difference is that, in the euro area, open
market operations are decentralized; each national
central bank executes operations with the financial
institutions in its area, although these operations
are coordinated by the ECB. 
The main difference in the tools used by the
two central banks is in the system of overnight loans
made to financial institutions. These are referred to
as discount window loans by the Federal Reserve
and the marginal lending facility by the ECB.28 In
the United States, the board of directors of each
Fed Bank sets the discount rate (the interest rate it
charges on overnight loans to financial institutions)
subject to approval of the Board of Governors.29
The discount rate is set below the federal funds rate
target, yet very little borrowing occurs.30 This is
because the Federal Reserve discourages borrowing
at the discount window.31
The marginal lending facility operated by the
ECB also provides overnight loans to financial
institutions. The marginal lending rate is the rate at
which financial institutions may borrow from the
national central banks. It is set by the Governing
Council and is always above the main refinancing
rate.32 In contrast to the constraints of the discount
window, banks are allowed to freely borrow from
this facility.33
The ECB operates another standing facility in
addition to the marginal lending facility. The deposit
facility allows banks to deposit funds overnight at
the national central banks and earn interest on these
deposits. These deposits are beyond those required
to meet the minimum reserve requirement, dis-
cussed here later. The Federal Reserve also allows
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30 In recent years the policy has been to set the discount rate 50 basis
points below the federal funds rate target.
31 An exception occurred on September 11, 2001, when the Federal
Reserve encouraged use of the discount window following disruptions
in the federal funds market.
32 The marginal lending rate most often has been set at 100 basis points
above the main refinancing rate.
33 Banks must have adequate collateral to borrow, as is also required
for discount window loans.
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27 Two major exceptions have occurred in the last few years. The first
was at the end of December 1999, when, as a Y2K precaution, the
Federal Reserve allowed the federal funds rate to fall to ensure adequate
liquidity for banks. The second was in the aftermath of September 11,
2001, when again the Federal Reserve allowed the federal funds rate
to fall sharply to provide liquidity to banks.
28 The discount window discussed in the text refers to the provision of
adjustment credit, that is, credit extended to meet short-term liquidity
needs of financial institutions. The regional banks also make discount
window loans for seasonal and extended credit, at rates above the
discount rate for adjustment credit. Extended credit is used in con-
junction with the Federal Reserve’s lender-of-last-resort function.
29 Originally discount rates varied across Districts. But with the emer-
gence of a national credit market, the Federal Reserve maintains a
uniform discount rate. banks to deposit excess reserves at the District Banks
but does not pay interest on these reserves. The ECB
deposit rate is set below the marginal refinancing
rate, and typically the two standing facility rates
form a symmetric band around the main refinancing
rate, as shown in Figure 6. 
More importantly, because banks are allowed
to freely deposit and borrow through the standing
facilities, the deposit rate and the marginal lending
rate form a band around the euro overnight index
average rate (EOINA), the overnight interbank rate.
No bank will borrow money from another bank if
it can borrow at a lower interest rate from the ECB,
so the marginal lending rate sets the upper bound
for EOINA. No bank will lend money at a lower
interest rate than it can get by depositing money at
the ECB, so the deposit rate sets the lower bound
for EOINA, as shown in Figure 6.
The Federal Reserve has proposed changing
the discount window by setting the discount rate
100 basis points above the federal funds rate target
and not restricting borrowing.34 This would discour-
age borrowing through a pricing mechanism rather
than through the current administrative process. At
the same time, the discount window would provide
a source of funds when the money market tightens,
raising the federal funds rate above its target. The
discount rate would also act as a ceiling on the
federal funds rate. The proposed changes would
make the discount window function similar to the
ECB’s marginal lending rate.
The Federal Reserve has expressed its support
for paying interest on overnight deposits.35 Although
several bills have been introduced in Congress in
recent years to permit this, none have been passed.
Both central banks have established minimum
reserve requirements for financial institutions. These
are not now used as an active policy tool, as adjust-
ments are infrequent. The Maastricht Treaty gave
the Governing Council the right but not the obligation
to set reserve requirements. The Federal Reserve
Act, as amended by the 1980 Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act, requires
the Federal Reserve to impose minimum reserve
requirements on all depository institutions. The
1980 amendments also established the ranges for
these requirements. The Federal Reserve may, how-
ever, temporarily suspend the reserve requirements
(Section 11C). 
Making Monetary Policy Decisions
Monetary policy decisions for the United States
and the euro area are made by the FOMC of the
Federal Reserve and the Governing Council of the
ECB, respectively. The FOMC consists of the seven
members of the Board of Governors, the president
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and four
other District Bank presidents who serve on a rotat-
ing basis.36 Each District is grouped with one or
two others as follows: Boston, Philadelphia, and
Richmond; Cleveland and Chicago; Atlanta, Dallas,
and St. Louis; and, Minneapolis, Kansas City, and
San Francisco. The presidents of all 12 District Banks
attend and participate in the policy deliberations
of the FOMC, but only the members of the Board
and the five presidents may vote on policy actions.
The membership of the Governing Council of the
ECB is much simpler, consisting of the six members
of the Executive Board and all 12 euro area governors.
By law the Governing Council is required to
meet at least ten times per year while the FOMC is
required to meet only four times per year. Since its
inception the Governing Council has generally met
twice per month. This is far more than the FOMC,
which since 1981 has scheduled eight meetings per
year. Perhaps as a result, the FOMC has more often
added meetings (generally through teleconferencing)
to react to economic factors that have arisen during
the intermeeting period. For example, the FOMC
held three such meetings during 2001 (although
these were the first since October 15, 1999). The
only time the Governing Council has added a meet-
ing was on September 17, 2001, to join the Federal
Reserve in cutting interest rates as U.S. stock markets
reopened following the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks.
If eight meetings per year may sometimes be
too few, 24 meetings per year may be too many. In
November 2001, the Governing Council decided to
generally limit its monetary policy discussions to
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36 When the FOMC was created by a 1933 amendment to the Federal
Reserve Act, it consisted of “as many members as there are Federal
reserve districts” (Section 12A). The board of directors of each Reserve
Bank selected the representative from that District. Members of the
Board of Governors were permitted to attend the meetings. In 1935
membership was changed to include “the members of the Board of
Governors of the Federal Reserve System and five representatives of
the Federal Reserve banks” (Section 12A). In 1942, New York was given
a permanent position on the FOMC and the current groupings for
the other Districts were established. In addition, the representative
chosen by the board of directors of each District Bank had to be either
the president or vice president of the Bank (BOG, 2000).
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34 See Madigan and Nelson (2002).
35 See, for example, Meyer (2001).the first meeting of each month. As explained by
Duisenberg (2001):
We have the impression that the bi-monthly
meetings of the Governing Council also lead,
every two weeks, to speculation in the mar-
kets and higher volatility in exchange rates
and market interest rates than would be the
case if we had a calmer rhythm of meetings.
The second monthly meeting is still held but now
focuses on issues related to the other tasks of the
ECB.
Preparing for Policy Meetings. Generally on
the Thursday preceding a Tuesday FOMC meeting,
members of the FOMC and the other District Bank
presidents receive the Greenbook, a report on the
state of the economy prepared by the Board of
Governors staff and named for the color of its
cover. The Greenbook contains the Board staff’s
analysis of current economic conditions as well as
a forecast of the economy.37 A few days later the
Bluebook arrives. This report, also prepared by the
Board staff and also named after the color of its
cover, summarizes conditions in financial markets
and lists the policy options. Two or three options
are given, one of which is always to make no change
in policy.38
About two days prior to the Thursday monetary
policy meeting, members of the Governing Council
receive a copy of the Orangebook (again, named for
the color of its cover), prepared by the ECB’s chief
economist (currently Ottmar Issing), who is also a
member of the Executive Board.39 The Orangebook,
like the Greenbook, provides an analysis of economic
and monetary conditions. In contrast to the Blue-
book, it provides not a range of policy options, but
a policy recommendation.
The Policy Meeting.40 The meetings of the
Governing Council are more informal than those
of the FOMC, with fewer attendees and fewer formal
presentations. Table 3 lists the attendees at a typical
meeting of the two policymaking boards. With the
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38 A detailed discussion of the FOMC meeting is given by Meyer (1998).
Poole (1999) and Nash (2002) also provide insights into the workings
of the FOMC.
39 Information on the meetings of the Governing Council is from Haring
and Barber (2002).
40 The proceedings of a monetary policy meeting, particularly with
respect to the policy discussion, often reflect the style of the head of
the central bank.
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Typical Attendees at a Meeting of the FOMC and the Governing Council
FOMC Governing Council
12 members of FOMC 18 members of the Governing Council
7 other District Bank presidents Translators
12 District research directors Minute taker
Secretary of the FOMC European Commissioner for Monetary Affairs, possibly
Deputy Secretary of the FOMC Chair of the euro area finance ministers, possibly
2 assistant secretaries
Manager of System Open Market Account
Director of Research and Statistics, Board of Governors
Director of the Division of International Finance, 
Board of Governors




SOURCE: Minutes of the FOMC and Haring and Barber (2002).
Table 3
37 District Bank presidents are also briefed by their staff economists
prior to meetings of the FOMC. Only limited numbers of the District
staff are allowed to see the reports prepared by the staff at the Board
of Governors.exception of translators, there are normally no more
than 21 attendees at the meetings of the Governing
Council.41 The meetings of the FOMC typically
have between 50 and 60 attendees.
Monetary policy meetings of the Governing
Council open with a presentation by the ECB’s chief
economist on the economic outlook report from the
Orangebook. The other members of the Governing
Council then present their views on policy. The ECB
president summarizes the discussion and attempts
to form a consensus on policy. No formal vote is
taken at the meeting.
Meetings of the FOMC begin with a presentation
by the Manager of the System Open Market Account
at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, who dis-
cusses open market operations undertaken during
the intermeeting period as well as developments in
domestic financial markets and foreign exchange
markets.42 Next, the director of Research and
Statistics and the director of the Division of Inter-
national Finance at the Board of Governors discuss
the Board staff’s forecast and international develop-
ments, respectively. Following these presentations,
the Reserve Bank presidents and the members of
the Board of Governors provide their own assessment
of economic conditions and the outlook. The next
part of the meeting focuses on a discussion of policy.
The director of Monetary Affairs at the Board out-
lines the policy options given in the Bluebook. The
Chairman then presents his policy preference. This
is followed by an open discussion by members of
the FOMC and the other District Bank presidents. At
the close of this discussion the Chairman summa-
rizes the discussion. He then reads a policy directive
that reflects the view of the committee. The members
of the FOMC vote on the policy directive.
INDEPENDENCE, ACCOUNTABILITY,
AND TRANSPARENCY
In establishing the European System of Central
Banks, policymakers endowed it with a high degree
of independence from the governments of the mem-
ber states and the European Union. The Governing
Council, for example, was given explicit control
over the tools of monetary policy and is prohibited
from taking advice from the governments of the
euro area. Even the nonrenewable term of office of
members of the Executive Board was designed to
protect them from political interference.43 The
Maastricht Treaty not only guaranteed the indepen-
dence of the ECB, but also required that the national
central banks be independent as a prerequisite for
joining the Eurosystem.
This emphasis on independence was supported
by various studies in the late 1980s and early 1990s
that showed a negative correlation between the
degree of independence of the central bank and the
country’s inflation rate.44 Moreover, studies showed
that a country did not have to sacrifice growth to
achieve a lower rate of inflation. These studies helped
fuel changes in the legal status of many central
banks, reducing the amount of direct government
control and increasing the emphasis on price stabil-
ity. When the Federal Reserve Act was passed in
1913, independence of monetary policy was less
of a concern: The Secretary of the Treasury as well
as the Comptroller of the Currency were members
of the Federal Reserve Board, and the former was the
Chairman of the Board. Over time, however, the
independence of the Federal Reserve has increased.
Congress eliminated the two government positions
on the Board effective in 1936.45 The length of the
term of office for Board members was increased
from the original 10 years to 12 years in 1933 and
then to the current 14 years in 1935. A key step in
increasing the independence of the Federal Reserve
was the 1951 Federal Reserve–Treasury Accord that
released the Federal Reserve from a requirement,
begun during World War II, to maintain interest rate
ceilings on Treasury securities. This accord is seen
as establishing the independence of monetary policy. 
Independence, however, is not without its draw-
backs. The decisions made by central bankers can
have a profound effect on the economy and hence
the public. Central bank independence removes
these decisions from the hands of elected officials
and restricts the ability of the government to remove
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43 The appointment process, however, has not been without political
meddling. When the selections for the initial Executive Board were
being made, there was a general agreement among the member govern-
ments to appoint Duisenberg as president of the ECB. France, however,
insisted that its own candidate, Jean Claude Trichet, be appointed
president. France agreed to support Duisenberg only after he agreed
to resign part way through his term. On February 7, 2002, Duisenberg
announced that he would resign on July 9, 2003, after serving slightly
more than five years of his eight-year term.
44 See Pollard (1993) for a review of this literature.
45 The 1935 amendment to the Federal Reserve Act that made this
change also changed the name of the Federal Reserve Board to the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
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41 According to Haring and Barber (2002), although translators are
available, English is the common language of the Governing Council
meetings.
42 Information in this section comes from Meyer (1998).central bank officials. Thus, in democratic societies
accountability and transparency are seen as neces-
sary to counterbalance central bank independence.
Accountability holds the central bank responsible
for its actions. Transparency, the ease with which
policy actions can be observed and understood, is
necessary for accountability. As explained by Roger
Ferguson (2001), the vice chairman of the Board of
Governors, transparency “gives the public the tools
to hold the independent central bank accountable.”
Accountability
For what should the central bank be accountable
and to whom should it be accountable? The central
bank should be held accountable for its legislative
mandate—specifically, the goals set by the govern-
ment.46 Recall that the goal of the ECB is price
stability—specifically, as defined by the Governing
Council, an inflation rate of less than 2 percent over
the medium term. The goals of the Federal Reserve
are maximum employment, stable prices, and
moderate interest rates. Accountability is easier
when the central bank has a single goal, or at least
a ranking of goals; for, as explained by Meyer (2000),
multiple goals “always carry trade-offs, at least in
the short-run, which are subject to the discretion
of the central bank.” The precision of numerical
goals also aids in accountability.47
Ultimately a central bank should be accountable
to the public; but, since the public has no direct
control over the central bank, it is the obligation of
the elected representatives of the people to hold the
central bank accountable for its mandate. In the
United States, it is natural that the Federal Reserve
be accountable to Congress. Not only are the mem-
bers of Congress the direct representatives of the
American people, but Congress also has the ability
to change the mandate of the Federal Reserve
through amending the Federal Reserve Act. More-
over, it was Congress that delegated its constitutional
authority to “coin money” and “regulate the value
thereof” to the Federal Reserve.48
Indeed, in 1977 Congress amended the Federal
Reserve Act to list the goals of the Federal Reserve
and to require the Board of Governors to consult
with Congress twice per year. This occurs through
the Chairman’s testimony before the Senate Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee and the
House Banking and Financial Services Committee.
The following year Congress further amended the
Federal Reserve Act to require the Board of Governors
to submit a written report to Congress prior to the
Chairman’s appearance before the congressional
committees. This report had to include three things:
(i) an analysis of recent economic conditions, (ii)
the FOMC’s forecast of economic conditions and
monetary and credit aggregates, and (iii) the relation-
ship between this forecast and the administration’s
forecast. The Federal Reports Elimination and Sunset
Act of 1995 terminated the legal requirement for
these semiannual reports and testimony at the end
of 1999. Nevertheless, the FOMC decided to con-
tinue the reports and testimony as it believed they
“enhanced its accountability to the public and the
Congress” (FOMC, 1999). 
In December 2000 Congress amended the
Federal Reserve Act, reinstating the reporting
requirement. Section 2B now specifies that “the
Chairman of the Board shall appear before the
Congress at semi-annual hearings” and that the
Board shall submit a written report. The report is
to contain 
A discussion of the conduct of monetary
policy and economic developments and
prospects for the future, taking into account
past and prospective developments in
employment, unemployment, production,
investment, real income, productivity,
exchange rates, international trade and
payments, and prices. (Section 2B (b))
Within the euro area, it is more difficult to
answer the “accountable to whom” question. The
European Parliament is a good candidate since it
represents the European public. As stated by Padoa-
Schioppa (2000), a member of the Executive Board,
In the political order of the European Union,
the only institution that directly derives its
role and legitimacy from the citizens is the
European Parliament…The European
Parliament is the institution of Europe’s
democratically elected representatives,
which represents the interests of the peoples
of Europe.
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46 This implies that a central bank has instrument independence, not
goal independence, as distinguished by Debelle and Fischer (1994)
and discussed in Meyer (2000). 
47 Numerical goals, however, are not always easy to define. For example,
Judd and Rudebusch (1999) and Meyer (2000) point out that defining
full employment is difficult since there is no consensus on an unem-
ployment rate that corresponds to full employment. In addition, full
employment is not a constant but varies as a result of demographics
and government policies.
48 See Article 1, Section 8, Clause 5 of the Constitution of the United States.Yet, unlike the relationship between the U.S.
Congress and the Federal Reserve, the European
Parliament has little authority over the ECB. The
European Parliament may request that members of
the Executive Board appear before its committees,
but has no such power over the other members of
the Governing Council (the governors of the national
central banks).49 Parliament gives advice on the
appointments to the Executive Board but has no
veto power over these, unlike the role of the U.S.
Senate.50 Furthermore, Parliament has no power to
change the laws governing the ECB. Indeed, the only
way to change the mandate of the ECB or most
other regulations regarding its operation is through
an amendment to the treaty. This requires the agree-
ment of all 15 governments of the European Union
and then ratification of the amendments by the 15
national parliaments. In some countries passage of
a public referendum is also necessary. Furthermore,
the ECB must be consulted before any changes can
be made to its charter.
The Maastricht Treaty does require the ECB to
report annually “on the monetary policy of both the
previous and current year” (Article 113) to the
European Parliament, ECOFIN, the European Com-
mission, and the European Council. The president
of the ECB must present the report to the European
Parliament and to ECOFIN. This requirement to
report to multiple bodies reflects the lack of a single
institution that has control over the mandate of the
central bank and represents the European public.
Transparency
Transparency in monetary policy includes three
key aspects: (i) transparency in goals, (ii) transparency
in policy decisions, and (iii) transparency in the
outlook. The first requires not only that the goals
of the central bank be clearly defined but that they
be easily understood.51 The Maastricht Treaty clearly
identifies the goal of the ECB—price stability. The
Governing Council further clarified this goal by
giving a quantitative definition to price stability.
Since deviations from price stability at a point in
time are not necessarily indicators of a failure of
policy, the ECB also sets a monetary aggregate target
as a way to determine whether its policies are likely
to be successful.
The goals of the Federal Reserve are stated in
the Federal Reserve Act; but, as noted here previously,
these goals are neither defined nor ranked. The
FOMC was required to set monetary aggregate targets
by the Federal Reserve Act; when this requirement
expired at the end of 1999, however, it abandoned
the practice.
Transparency also requires that policy decisions
be communicated to the public in a clear way along
with the reasoning behind the decisions. The ECB
issues a press release and the president of the ECB
holds a news conference (also attended by the vice
president) following the monetary policy meetings
of the Governing Council.52 The press release
announces any changes in the main refinancing,
marginal lending, and deposit rates. At the press
conference the President gives an overview of econ-
omic conditions and the outlook for the euro area
to provide a framework for the policy decision. The
ECB also publishes a monthly bulletin discussing
any policy changes as well as economic conditions
in the euro area.53
The Federal Reserve also issues a press release
following each FOMC meeting, but does not hold a
news conference. Perhaps, as a result, the press
release is more detailed than that of the Governing
Council.54 The press release begins with an
announcement of any change in the federal funds
rate target. It then provides a brief overview of
economic conditions and the reason for any policy
change. Since March 2002, the release has included
the vote of the FOMC. If any member dissents from
the approved policy action, the member is named
and the preferred policy action is noted. The release
also states any changes in the discount rates along
with a list of Districts requesting the change.
A day or so following its next scheduled meeting,
the FOMC releases the minutes of the previous
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52 Prior to 2001, when the Governing Council met twice per month to
formulate monetary policy, the press conference was held only after
one of the monthly meetings.
53 The press releases, transcripts of the press conference, and bulletin
are available at <www.ecb.int>.
54 See the boxed insert “Press Releases Following Meetings of the FOMC
and the Governing Council” for a comparison of recent press releases
by the two central banks.
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49 Currently, once per quarter the ECB President appears before the
European Parliament Committee of Economic and Monetary Affairs
to explain the recent policy decisions of the Governing Council.
50 The U.S. Senate has no input into the appointments of the presidents
of the District Banks nor does the European Parliament have any input
into the appointments of the heads of the national central banks. On
the FOMC, members of the Board of Governors outnumber the presi-
dents; on the Governing Council, the governors of the national central
banks outnumber the members of the Executive Board. 
51 See Judd and Rudebusch (1999). meeting.55 The minutes provide a more detailed
summary of the economic conditions, outlook,
and reasons underlying the policy stance adopted
at the meeting. The minutes do not ascribe policy
views to any particular member of the FOMC except
in the case of a dissenting vote.
The ECB does not release minutes of its meetings
nor are there formal votes. Every year the European
Parliament has passed a resolution calling on the
ECB to publish the minutes of Governing Council
meetings. Members of the Governing Council argue
that releasing minutes would limit the exchange of
ideas that occur at the meeting and furthermore that
the press conference already provides a summary
of the meeting.56 The European Parliament has
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PRESS RELEASES FOLLOWING POLICY MEETINGS OF THE 
FOMC AND GOVERNING COUNCIL
Federal Reserve Press Release
Release Date: September 24, 2002
For immediate release 
The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to keep its target for the federal funds rate unchanged
at 1 3/4 percent. 
The information that has become available since the last meeting of the Committee suggests that
aggregate demand is growing at a moderate pace. 
Over time, the current accommodative stance of monetary policy, coupled with still robust underlying
growth in productivity, should be sufficient to foster an improving business climate. However, considerable
uncertainty persists about the extent and timing of the expected pickup in production and employment
owing in part to the emergence of heightened geopolitical risks. 
Consequently, the Committee believes that, for the foreseeable future, against the background of its
long-run goals of price stability and sustainable economic growth and of the information currently
available, the risks are weighted mainly toward conditions that may generate economic weakness. 
Voting for the FOMC monetary policy action were: Alan Greenspan, Chairman; William J. McDonough,
Vice Chairman; Ben S. Bernanke; Susan S. Bies; Roger W. Ferguson, Jr.; Jerry L. Jordan; Donald L. Kohn;
Mark W. Olson; Anthony M. Santomero, and Gary H. Stern. 
Voting against the action were: Edward M. Gramlich and Robert D. McTeer, Jr. 




At today’s meeting the Governing Council of the ECB decided that the minimum bid rate on the main
refinancing operations and the interest rates on the marginal lending facility and the deposit facility
will remain unchanged at 3.25%, 4.25% and 2.25% respectively. 
The President of the ECB will comment on the considerations underlying these decisions at a press
conference starting at 2.30 p.m. today.
55 The press release and minutes are available at <www.federalreserve.
gov/fomc>.
56 See, for example, Hämäläinen (2000).also called on the Governing Council to vote and
to include in the minutes a summary of the vote
without listing names. Duisenberg (2002) has
argued that listing the dissenting views even
anonymously “could lead to undue pressure on
national central bank governors to deviate from a
euro area perspective.”
Transparency in policy also extends to the out-
look for the economy. Understanding the central
bank’s outlook for the economy provides a guide
to future policy moves. The Federal Reserve releases
two types of information regarding its outlook for
the economy. In its semiannual report to Congress
it publishes the range and central tendency of the
individual forecasts of the members of the Board of
Governors and the presidents of the District Banks
with respect to output, inflation, and unemployment
for the current and following year. Since February
2000 the press release issued by the FOMC includes
a balance of risks statement that indicates
how the Committee assesses the risks of
heightened inflation pressures or economic
weakness in the foreseeable future. This time
frame in the new language is intended to
cover an interval extending beyond the next
FOMC meeting. (Federal Reserve Press
Release, January 19, 2000) 
The balance of risks statement (particularly shifts
in the balance) is viewed as an indicator of future
policy by the FOMC.57
The ECB initially resisted publishing forecasts,
but began including them in its Monthly Bulletin in
December 2000. Neither the Federal Reserve nor
the ECB publishes detailed forecasts like the staff
forecasts of the Board of Governors. 
CONCLUSION
Central banking is often described as an art, not
a science. As a result there is no blueprint for the
structure and operations of a central bank. Although
the structures of the Federal Reserve System and
the Eurosystem are similar, there are many differ-
ences in the way they operate. The Eurosystem is
more decentralized than the Federal Reserve, with
more tasks left to the national central banks. Even
the conduct of monetary policy is more decentral-
ized. Open market operations in the United States
are conducted only by the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York, following discussion between the staff at
the Open Market Desk and at the Board of Governors.
In the Eurosystem each national central bank carries
out open market operations, although these are
coordinated with the ECB.
The Board of Governors has more control over
the appointments of the presidents of the District
Banks than the Executive Board has over appoint-
ments of the heads of the national central banks.
In the United States, the District Bank presidents
must be approved by the Board of Governors. In
Europe the national governments alone determine
the heads of the national central banks.
Of course, the structure of central banks is not
static. Over its 90-year history, the legislation govern-
ing the Federal Reserve has been amended numerous
times. Although the laws governing the Eurosystem
are more cumbersome to amend, if it follows the
path of the Federal Reserve then centralization will
increase over time.
Transparency has also increased. Not so many
years ago monetary policy was shrouded in secrecy.
Central banks seemed to make every effort to pre-
vent monetary policy from being comprehensible
to the general public. Initially, measures aimed at
greater transparency were often imposed upon
central banks. Perhaps surprising, central banks
themselves have become champions of trans-
parency, for transparency not only has proved to
be helpful in making central banks more account-
able but also has had the added benefits of increasing
the credibility and predictability of monetary policy.
As put by William Poole (2001), president of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, “we expect better
public policy outcomes from a transparent process.” 
Disagreements remain over how to best make
policy transparent while at the same time preserving
the independence of the central banks. The Federal
Reserve, for example, has recently begun publishing
the roll call on the policy directive immediately
following an FOMC meeting. If there is a dissent the
action preferred by the dissenter(s) is also given. The
ECB not only does not publish the vote, but also does
not have a formal vote on policy at the Governing
Council meetings. It is concerned that, given the
multinational character of the Eurosystem, any
knowledge of voting would lead to political pressure
on the representatives of the national central banks.
Over time, as the credibility and independence of
the Eurosystem becomes established, it is likely
that such concerns will fade. 
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